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Penal Disenfranchisement 
1. Introduction 
At present in the U.K., prisoners serving a custodial sentence do not have the right to vote 
for the duration of their sentence.1 This disenfranchisement is part of a range of collateral 
sanctions attached to criminal conviction (such as ineligibility for jury service, requirement 
to state recent previous convictions on job applications, inability to get a clear Criminal 
Records Bureau check when applying to work with children (von Hirsch and Wasik 1997; 
Lafollette 2005; Hoskins 2014)). The U.K.ǯ approach to disenfranchising prisoners is 
significantly less harsh than that in operation in many U.S. states, where the vote may be 
removed for life from felons, as is the case in Iowa, or returned only on special application, 
as with Florida.2 But many European countries (including, since 2007, the Irish Republic), 
give all prisoners the vote. In what follows I assess some of the main arguments that can be 
given in favour of prisoner disenfranchisement in order to discover whether an adequate 
rationale can be given and, if so, what practical policies it might imply.  
 
The investigation looks at three main strategies. Firstly, I consider the claim that the 
removal of the right to vote from prisoners (or serious offenders) is necessary as a practical 
matter to protect the democratic process from those who have shown themselves to be 
untrustworthy. Secondly, I look at the claim that offenders have broken the social contract 
and forfeited rights to participate in making law. And thirdly, I look at the claim that the 
voting ban could be an important part of the justified punishment of serious offenders. 
These arguments have in common the feature that they attempt to articulate the sense in 
which rights imply responsibilities, particularly that voting rights should be conditional on ǯǯ (Deigh 1988). I argue that the only 
interpretation of this view that could justify prisoner disenfranchisement is that which 
thinks of disenfranchisement as fair and deserved retributive punishment for crime. 
Against widespread opposition to, and confusion about, the importance of retributive 
punishment, I offer a brief explanation and defence. I attempt to show how 
disenfranchisement is at least the right sort of thing to be a punishment. However, I 
conclude that even if legitimate retributive purposes could in principle justify prisoner 
disenfranchisement, the significance of disenfranchisement is such that it should be 
reserved for the most serious crimes. 
 
First of all, however, it is worth saying something about the importance of the right to vote. 
As Jeremy Waldron has noted, there are various ways in which having a say in the 
democratic process might be important (Waldron 1993). First of all, there might be the ǲǤǳǡǯ
                                                     
1 Though following the 2005 Hirst judgement of the European Court of Human Rights, this may be set to 
change. 
2 For an up-to-date account of U.S. state legislation on felon disenfranchisement, see: 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_bs_fdlawsinus_Nov2012.pdf 
able to exercise some control over the laws of their political community, thus to further 
their own priorities and get their point of view taken seriously by decision-makers. Thirdly, 
having the right to vote and engage in democratic debate encourages a person to be open to 
other points of view and to see the need to justify their own perspective in terms that 
others could come to understand Ȃ ǲeducative ǳ (Lippke 2001). Fourthly, and perhaps most 
fundamentally, having the right to vote is also a marker of an important status, shared 
equally with other fellow citizens: it marks a person as having the ability and right to 
govern her own life and to join with others in determining the government of the collective. ǯǡ
Rousseau would have it, only a law in the formulation of which she has an equal say is fit to 
govern her. To turn these points around, the removal of the right to vote threatens to a) ǯǢȌ
control that each person has over the laws that affect her; c) remove access to political and 
moral education; and d) remove her equal status as citizen. 
 
As Lippke says, however, while we may accept all the items in the last paragraph as 
important benefits of having the right to vote, it is not clear that actual possession of the 
right to vote is necessary for a person to obtain those benefits. For instance, plenty of forms 
of political participation remain open even if one lacks the right to vote. A person loses 
control over the final decision made by the vote: but, it might be said, the control that any 
one person exercises over the final decision is small. This suggests that the major evil in the 
loss of the vote is an essentially symbolic one, and concerns a loss of status or equality.3 To 
say that the evil is essentially symbolic is not in any way to downgrade it. Failures of 
respect, including the failure to basic respect that we are due in virtue of being human, 
might be in part at least symbolic wrongs, and this does nothing to undermine their 
seriousness.  
 
2. Do we need to defend the democratic process against the participation of 
prisoners? 
It is sometimes claimed that, through their crime, serious offenders have shown an 
irresponsible attitude to the law and its values, and to the demands of social cooperation. 
This is combined with the claim that, for democracy to flourish, citizens have to have a level 
of commitment to the value of the process, and respect for their fellow deliberators. The 
conclusion is drawn, then, that those who commit serious offences ought to be disqualified 
                                                     
3
 This claim should be interpreted as a tentative one, and not something on which the argument of the paper rests. 
Two points might be made against the argument put forward in the text here. First of all, it might be said that having 
DYRWHPDNHVRQH¶VRWKHUIRUPVRISROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQPRUHHIIHFWLYHVLQFHSROLWLFDOUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVKDYHDUHDVRQ
WRSD\PRUHDWWHQWLRQWRRQH¶VYLHws if there are votes behind them. And secondly, it might be argued that the 
discussion in the passage rests on an over-individualistic view of the relation between interests and rights: if 
prisoners in general have legitimate interests qua prisoners that will be ignored in public policy-making as long as 
they have no vote, this might speak in favour of their having the vote as a way of getting these interests on to the 
agenda, even though the control interest any particular individual has in having a vote is slight. I am grateful to 
Daniel Viehoff for discussions on both of these points. 
from having the vote because they have shown themselves to be irresponsible (Clegg 2007; 
cf. Ewald 2002; Reiman 2005). There are two challenges for this view. The first is that an 
argument would have to be given to the effect that a polity is justified in removing the right 
to vote from those it deems untrustworthy. At present the right to vote is presumptive in 
the sense that one need not earn it: no qualification Ȃ even a very minimal one such as, for 
instance, passing a literacy test Ȃ is necessary (Manfredi 1998). Whereas if we accept this 
argument it might also follow that we should introduce other restrictions on the franchise: 
to introduce basic competence tests for voters; and to be far more serious than we 
currently are about citizenship education (Mauer 2011; Demleitner 2000). Some may think 
that, on the contrary, such a policy would conflict with the values of inclusiveness and 
commitment to open-ended debate that ought to characterise democratic society; also 
problematic would be the question of who would be given the authority to decide when a 
person is untrustworthy or not. Others may think that this is not a significant problem: 
perhaps it is a bullet we ought to be willing to bite. After all, even if we accept that the 
democratic process is important and should be reserved for those who appreciate its 
importance, it need not follow that we should test people to ensure that they qualify. The 
good society will have various concerns, not just that of upholding the integrity of its 
democracy. It will want to avoid intrusive procedures such as competence tests. So just as 
one has a presumptive right to walk freely down the highway without having to prove to ǯǡ
that one is competent to vote until one shows otherwise. Offenders, though, it might be 
said, have flagrantly shown that they do not respect the law. They have presented the 
authorities with clear evidence that does not need to be collected in an intrusive way. In 
that case, it might be argued that the right to vote can permissibly be withdrawn. On the 
other hand, though, we might point out that voting is not the only form of political activity 
that prisoners or other allegedly irresponsible citizens might engage in Ȃ and certainly not 
the most powerful in terms of its outcomes. Should offenders Ȃ and others Ȃ also be banned 
from other potentially subversive political activity such as letter-writing, campaigning, 
reading political material (Lippke 2001: 558)? 
 
However, even if this first challenge can be met, a second challenge remains for those who 
wish to appeal to justify the disenfranchisement of offenders on these grounds. This is that 
this strategy does not justify the disenfranchisement of all and only prisoners (or serious 
offenders). It does not justify the disenfranchisement of only offenders because it is not ǯ
disrespect for the democratic process, the rule of law, the values underpinning the way of 
life of the polis, etc.. And it does not justify removing the right to vote from all prisoners 
because it is not the case that the commission of all criminal offences, even all serious ones, 
necessarily shows that one rejects the authority of the law or its substantive values. Many 
offences are committed in the heat of the moment or under emotional pressure, by people 
who deeply regret what they have done and would not claim to have been justified in so 
acting (Reiman 2005). Therefore any removal of the right to vote on these grounds would 
need to be discriminating as opposed to the blanket ban we have at present.  
 
We have not shown that this defence of disenfranchisement is altogether unworkable. But 
its proponents clearly have some bullets to bite. 
 3. Breaking the social contract? 
The problem with the argument we have just been considering is that it is not the offending 
action itself that counts in favour of losing the right. Rather the offending action is seen as a 
sign of something else, such as irresponsibility, that does, so it is argued, count in favour of 
losing the right. But as we have seen, both steps of this argument are problematic, or in 
need of further defence: both that the irresponsible should lose the right to vote, and that 
criminal action is a reliable indicator of the relevant sort of irresponsibility. 
 
Thus another way of defending disenfranchisement would be to argue that rights and 
responsibilities are non-contingently connected, and that if one doesnǯǯ
responsibilities one will thereby ǯǤNotice that the idea of forfeiture does 
not make the loss of rights contingent. It is not (as with the argument considered in section  ?Ȍǯ s a reliable indicator that one is not the sort of 
person to whom it is advisable to afford rights if one wants to end up with a flourishing Ǥǯ
right to be a joint author of that law, just as one who continually flouts the rules of a game 
might forfeit the right that others include her in the game.  
 
Now there are two ways of understanding this view. On the first, the violation of the law 
means the forfeiture of all civic rights outright. On the second, the violation means the 
forfeiture rather of those specific rights that one has oneself violated. Let us deal with the 
first interpretation first. In order to back this argument up, one would have to find similar 
moral situations in which certain transgressions lead to the loss of rights. And an obvious 
case is that of having made a contract or mutual promise. Where a contract has been made, 
the violation of the terms of the contract by one party releases the other party from any 
obligation to honour their side of the bargain. Therefore if it could be argued that the moral 
relationship between citizen and state is like that of the relationship between two parties 
to a contract then the violation of the contract by the citizen would release the state from 
its obligations towards the citizen. In breaking the law the citizen loses civil rights like the 
right to vote. However, this argument has three main flaws. Firstly, even if it were 
successful, it would only show that society is permitted to remove rights from the offender, 
not that it positively ought to (Cholbi 2002: 553). Secondly, there is the familiar concern ǣǯ
obligations on either side are voluntarily assumed. The common move by contract theorists 
is to say that consent or agreement is tacit or implied; but where the consequences of 
violating the alleged contract are so drastic as to imply the outright loss of civic rights it 
might seem that tacit consent is not enough to make the contract binding. The third flaw 
concerns the implication of the contract model that it would be legitimate to treat the 
offender as without civic rights. The state Ȃ or society as a whole Ȃ is the provider of the 
basics of life. Little in the way of a decent life is possible outside it. Therefore the idea of 
removing all social rights and effectively imposing civic death is unacceptable (Kleinig and 
Murtagh 2008: 228).  
 
This leads us to the second way of understanding the forfeiture view, on which the moral 
effect of a violation is not the forfeiture of all rights but rather the forfeitǯ
to claim the protection specifically of that right that one failed to respect. On this 
interpretation the loss of rights would be limited and proportionate to the offence; it would 
speak to the sense that one might have about the first interpretation that the loss of all 
rights on the basis of a violation is disproportionate. Nevertheless, this interpretation is 
also problematic. The first problem is that it is pretty hopeless as a justification of offender 
disenfranchisement since the forfeiture of the right to vote would only come about for 
those who had committed some sort of electoral fraud or other offences specifically to do 
with the democratic process. The second problem is that the general principle that this 
interpretation claims to be valid Ȃ ǯǯȂ has unacceptable implications, such as that a 
rapist forfeits the right not to be raped.4  
 
What I have offered here, with the social contract interpretation, is another way of thinking 
about the idea that rights are conditional on responsibilities. I have suggested that this is ǣǡǯ
us to justify prisoner disenfranchisement. Yet something about that idea might still appear 
attractive, even if the reader agrees that the interpretations we have encountered so far are 
unattractive. So I now want to suggest a third interpretation, which reads the idea that 
rights are conditional on responsibilities not as the claim that offenders literally lose rights 
if they fail to keep up the corresponding responsibilities, but rather as the claim that those 
subject to responsibilities ought to be held accountable for the exercise of those 
responsibilities. This is the thought that we cannot simply ignore the violation of basic 
social responsibilities, and that we ought to take action against those who commit such 
violations in a way that reflects the gravity of those violations. Furthermore, action that 
reflects the gravity of those violations will normally involve doing something to the 
offender that he would otherwise have a right that we not do. (Hence there is indeed a loss 
of rights; a forfeiture if you like. However, the difference from the social contract 
explanation is that on the punishment view the notion of forfeiture is not doing the 
explanatory work; rather it is the notion of deserved condemnation that explains why the 
rights are lost.) In other words, I would like to explore the thought that we interpret the 
claim that rights imply responsibilities as the claim that those who have rights are ǡǯ
responsibilities will be met with punishment. Therefore this interpretation claims that 
disenfranchisement is fair punishment for the offence. 
 
4. Disenfranchisement as retributive punishment 
Common rationales given for punishment include: deterrence; retribution; incapacitation; 
and rehabilitation. It is only retribution that deserves serious consideration here as a 
rationale for removing voting rights for prisoners. Removing voting rights would appear to 
be contrary to rehabilitative purposes, since inclusion in voting and democratic activity 
more generally may be one small way in which offenders learn to take on the image of 
themselves as responsible players in a cooperative self-governing society. It might be 
proposed that the removal of voting rights is incapacitative in the sense that it removes the 
                                                     
4
 For a recent attempt to defend the forfeiture view, see Wellman (2012). 
possibility that those who are a danger to the health of democracy could affect democratic 
outcomes; this is effectively the argument considered in Section 2 of this paper, and its 
problems have already been highlighted. The threat of voting rights being removed seems 
unlikely to have any strong deterrent effect, partly since for such an effect to come about 
potential offenders would have to know and care about the loss of such rights, neither of 
which is particularly likely. Which leaves us with the retributive thought that offenders 
who have flouted the law deserve to lose the right to be joint authors of the law as part of 
their punishment for the crime. 
 
Two main problems, or sets of problems, Ǯǯ interpretation. 
One is the common concern that, despite its presence on official lists of the goals of 
punishment, retribution ȋǲǳȌis not a morally defensible 
aim of state action. And the other is that, even if retribution is defensible, retributive ǲǡǳ
punishment for most, if not all, offences. 
 
The second problem echoes ǲǳ
disenfranchisement found in the literature: that retributive punishment must be in some 
way proportionate to the crime; that prisoner disenfranchisement is a blanket imposition Ǣǲǳ
and seriousness of the particular crime (Demleitner 2000: 788-792; Reiman 2005: 9). This 
source of criticism of the retributive defence of disenfranchisement can itself be split into 
three important objections. First of all, it is sometimes said that, like the forfeiture view, the 
idea of retributive punishment is hamstrung by a failure to generalise. This is the concern 
that, on the basis that the punishment, as proportional, must have something to do with the 
crime, disenfranchisement as a punishment only works for political offences, or at any rate 
politically motivated offences, or perhaps even that it would only be a just punishment for 
electoral offences (Reiman2005: 9; Cholbi 2001: 545-547). Secondly, there is a problem 
concerning the relative indeterminacy of retributive sentencing theory: in particular, that it 
cannot explain why disenfranchisement should be carried out as well as imprisonment (or 
why would it be carried out rather than imprisonment). After all, even though offenders 
who are detained in prison lose some important rights, there are many important rights 
that they retain. How does the retributivist determine which crimes merit the loss of which 
rights (Cholbi: 2001: 548)? There is an interaction (of the horns of a dilemma type) 
between this objection and the last one, since one way to avoid the last objection is to 
widen out the notion of proportionality Ȃ which will, according to the current objection, 
lead to indeterminacy; whereas if we seek to avoid indeterminacy by narrowing down the 
notion of proportionality being used in order to avoid the current objection, the first 
objection recurs, that removal of political rights is fitting only for those whose crime is in 
some way political. If a retributivist defence of disenfranchisement is to be plausible it ǡǮǯ
element; or that that there is a respectable notion of proportionality that shows why 
disenfranchisement is fitting and proportional to crimes other than political ones. The third 
objection is that retributive disenfranchisement involves depriving the offender of a right 
that should be held unconditionally. For instance, Michael Cholbi argues that the 
possession of the right to vote is grounded in a basic right to self-determination. This right 
to self-determination, he thinks, cannot be lost because it derives from our fundamental 
moral status. But in that case, the right to vote cannot be lost either (Cholbi 2001: 549-550). 
 ǯ
others. For instance, we might find something importantly right about the view of South 
African Supreme Court judge Albie Sachs, whose opinion in the South African 
Constitutional Court judgement, in favour of extending the franchise to all offenders, is 
widely quoted: 
 ǲpersonhood. Quite 
literally, it says that everybody counts. In a country of great disparities of wealth 
and power it declares that whoever we are, whether rich or poor, exalted or 
disgraced, we all belong to the same democratic South African nation; that our Ǥǳ5 
 ǯ
citizens declares that the state belongs to all citizens equally, that each should have an 
equal say in the use of coercive political power. If we think about the removal of the right to 
vote from an ethnic group, even a group that rarely participated in elections, such 
disenfranchisement would be wrong in part because it would be to say that those people 
were not equal to those who were citizens and had no right to be involved in decision-
making. It would say that they are only to be subjects of law and not authors of that law. 
This is the symbolic evil of disenfranchisement that we discussed earlier in the paper. 
 
The question is, however, whether this evil would be visited on offenders if their vote is 
removed by way of punishment for some serious crime. In what follows, I will suggest that 
the objections to the retributive defence of penal disenfranchisement that we have just 
looked at rest on a narrow and inadequate view of what retribution and retributivism 
involve, and an associated inadequate and narrow view of proportion, such that retributive 
punishment involves visiting like harm on the offender, or like infringement of rights. In 
order to decide whether removing voting rights is a legitimate aspect of retribution, 
therefore, we now need to broach some of the fundamental questions in the philosophy of 
punishment. We need to know something about what retribution involves and why (or if) it 
is important. This will help us understand the importance of proportionality to 
punishment. And it might then help us address the question of how to determine whether 
the removal of voting rights is proportionate response to certain crimes, and if so which 
ones. 
 
5. What is retribution?  
Although it is an official rationale for criminal punishment in many countries, many people 
find it hard, on reflection, to agree that there is anything of value in pursuing retribution. 
For some, retribution is ultimately barbaric, and its incorporation into criminal justice 
                                                     
5 August and Another v Electoral Commission and Others (CCT8/99) [1999] ZACC 3; 1999 (3) SA 1; para 17 
[http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1999/3.html]. 
policy is, like the provocation ǡǲ
weaǤǳHowever, over the past forty years or so, philosophers have found fertile new 
ways to breathe life into retributive ideas, and it is now a respectable opinion that 
something important would be lost if retribution were abandoned altogether in a brave 
new world of criminal justice. 
 
Let us begin, then, by distinguishing a number of things that might be meant by retribution. 
First of all, retribution might mean revenge or retaliation. This is what most people have at 
the forefront of their minds when retribution comes up in conversation. But our tradition 
of thinking about retribution also contains within it ideas about redemption, as in the idea 
of atonement or penance as the undertaking of punishment in order to cleanse oneself of 
sin. And a third tradition of thinking about retribution ties it to the moral need to express 
condemnation of serious wrongdoing.  
 
Bearing these three aspects of retribution in mind, we could draw up three ways of 
thinking about proportionality in retributive punishment. On the first tradition, retaliation 
might require visiting like harm on the offender. On the second tradition, it is the offender 
undertaking punishment that is said to be necessary in order to expiate the crime, and thus 
proportionate punishment would be whatever is necessary for such expiation. And on the 
third tradition it might be said that proportionate punishment is whatever is necessary to 
express or do justice to the seriousness of the wrong. All of which is to say that a simple or 
over-literal understanding of lex talionis will not capture all that the retributive tradition 
can say about why we should punish and how much (for more on this, see Bennett 2013). 
 
The criticisms of retributive defences of disenfranchisement are best seen as targeting the 
first tradition. Thus for instance the claim that retributive punishment could only be for 
political offences assumes that punishment must be fitting to the crime in a fairly literal 
way. But that would only be devastating to the retributive defence if this interpretation of 
retribution were the strongest one; and I doubt that it is. Of course, the idea that 
wrongdoing requires a response that like treatment should be inflicted on the wrongdoer 
has not been without its defenders: ǯ
like treatment is necessary to remove advantage unfairly gained by the wrongdoer (Morris 
1968; Murphy 1973; Dagger 1993); the idea that like treatment is justified on the basis of 
equality in the way that the golden rule is justified (Reiman 1985); or the idea that like 
treatment is necessary in order to vindicate the victim and defeat the wrongdoer (Hampton 
1988). However, many would agree that defenders of this view have not yet found a 
version of this view that explains how visiting like suffering on an offender a) brings about 
something morally important that b) can only be done by visiting suffering on the offender 
rather than in some other way. It seems to me that the idea of retribution as justified 
condemnation or as a necessary part of making amends is more likely to be successful. 
 
To start with, I would like to put things in a slightly different focus. We have to challenge ǲǳibutive tradition, and that 
opponents are correct in rejecting retributive defences of disenfranchisement on the ǲǳǤ I would also like to suggest 
that ǯ
is, as well as morally questionable, too sophisticated to be the core idea of this tradition. It 
is unclear that our intuitions really support the idea that an offender deserves a like 
answering harm: many people who may have retributive tendencies do not.  
 
What seems clearer is that the core retributive intuition is to do with the non-contingent 
necessity for some kind of response to wrongdoing, just by virtue of its character as 
wrongdoing. In other words, what I suggest is the core thought is ǯ
in retributive action in the face of the offence, one will be in some condoning or accepting 
or becoming complicit in it. This way of looking at it speaks rather in favour of dissociation ǡǡǯ
with the offence, that one protests against it or refuses to acquiesce in it. What makes this 
retributive in the first place is that the actions responsive to wrongdoing are justified non-
instrumentally: they are constitutive of something that is non-contingently required, 
namely, dissociation from the wrong. The idea is that dissociative actions are called for, not 
in order to bring about some further good end, but in their own right, as doing justice to or 
bearing witness to the gravity of the offence.  
 
If we see non-instrumental dissociation as the heart of retributivism, we can distinguish 
two claims that any form of retributivism will have to make: first, the core claim that 
responsible wrongdoing calls inherently for some sort of dissociating action; and secondly, 
a further claim about what sort of action will bring about the relevant sort of dissociating. 
Retributivism understood as the idea that offenders deserve to have suffering imposed on 
them could then be understood as giving a particular interpretation of the second claim. 
 ǡ	ǯn 
revolves around ǲsymbolic non-acquiescenceǳ in the offence (Feinberg 1965). That is a nice 
phrase because it points out that, if we see the need for dissociation, we are faced with a 
question of getting the symbols right. It is only if we undertake the right sorts of symbolic 
action that we will successfully manage to dissociate ourselves from the offence. However, 
getting the right symbols is, contrary to Feinberg, not just a conventional matter (or at any ǡǲǳt the content of the symbol is arbitrary). 
There is a symbolic need because getting the symbols wrong will not have the right kind of 
moral effect.  
 
If this is along the right lines, the question is what symbols are the appropriate ones. This is 
where the ǲǳǤ
people reject retributivism is that they are unpersuaded that a morally important task 
requires the infliction of harm on the offender. In other words, imposing harm on the 
offender is not an effective and proportionate way of dissociating from the offence. What 
seems essential, rather, is that the response to wrongdoing should symbolise the need for 
dissociation itself.6 Hence a more convincing basis for adequate symbolization, I suggest, is 
distancing or withdrawal Ȃ withdrawal of the treatment that the person could standardly 
expect in his position. Thus we might withdraw certain forms of respect that are normally 
                                                     
6
 I have developed this view in Bennett (2002, 2008, 2012). 
owed to someone in that position, or to whom we have that relation, or withdraw help that 
we might normally offer. Common expressions of moral disapproval might therefore be a 
refusal to shake hands with someone, or a refusal to be in the same room as the person. Of 
course, that might indeed cause a person to suffer, but if it failed to cause suffering it would 
not have failed in its purpose. The purpose of the action is dissociation. 
 
It is important to notice at this point that what counts as actions of dissociation will be ǯ positions within a particular relationship. What counts as effective 
withdrawal will depend both ǯ offence is and what the relationship one 
has with the person is: for this relationship will determine what kind of respect or 
treatment the person can normally expect or be entitled to. Broadly speaking, it is not 
necessary to dissociate oneself from all wrongs as such. Dissociation becomes necessary 
when one would otherwise be implicated in (condoning or accepting of) the offence. When 
this is so is a hǯǤ
being in certain sorts of relationship with the offender can make it the case that a failure to 
take certain actions implies condonation, and it is then those in such relationships who 
have standing, and indeed obligation, to engage in blaming, condemnatory, dissociative 
activity. It is the partial and temporary withdrawal of positive treatment (signs of 
recognition and care) that one could normally expect specifically as a member of that 
relationship that are the effective symbols of dissociation.  
 
It is also important to note that the idea of dissociation also underpins the idea of feeling 
guilty and making amends: guilt is precisely the feeling of having been the person who 
(intentionally, responsibly) did something she needs to dissociate herself from; and making 
amends are the actions that bring about such dissociation. Therefore this idea has a good 
claim to be the core intuition in the retributive tradition.  
 
A third thing to note: we need to understand the dissociative action of withdrawing or 
cutting off in a sufficiently context-sensitive, subtle and nuanced way. One thing that can be 
going on when one withdraws from someone is that one dismisses the person or wants 
nothing more to do with them: severing the relationship. The important thing about the 
retributive reaction to wrongdoing that I have in mind, however, is that it is not like this. It 
is rather that withdrawal is a way of holding the agent to account. Withdrawing is a way, 
not of ending, but of affirming the relationship, in light of what the person has done. This is 
because the pǡǲǳ
account. This person is not simply a wild beast or an outsider; she is one of us who should 
have known better, should have cared more. This is a point that will important further on 
in the argument. What looks like neglect or exclusion can actually be affirmation that the 
person remains a party to the relationship despite her offence. 
 
If this is at all along the right lines then we might be able to see why it makes sense to claim 
that the partial and temporary removal of civic rights such as voting rights is indeed the 
sort of thing that could in principle be used by the state to express proportionate 
disapproval of wrongdoing. We can flesh this argument out briefly. When a wrong is 
committed, there is a question whether the state, or the polis whose state it is, has a 
retributive duty to dissociate itself from that wrong. It does not follow automatically that it 
has such a duty, since it is not the case that all parties have a duty to dissociate themselves 
from all wrongs. Broadly speaking, however, the state has a duty to dissociate itself from 
this wrong if it is the case that the state has legitimately taken on the responsibility of 
determining how it is permissible for citizens to act towards one another within this 
domain of action. In other words, if the state legitimately promulgates a criminal law for 
that domain, the standards of which claim to be authoritative for citizens, then the state is 
in some way claiming to regulate or arbitrate upon the bounds of permissible action for 
citizens within that domain (Raz 1979). If an action is committed that is wrong, and which 
the state has declared impermissible, the state has a duty to dissociate itself from the 
wrong. Not to mark the action as impermissible would be to condone it or treat it as 
permissible. How is such dissociation to be brought about? We have no better grasp on this 
than the grasp we have on the same question in the interpersonal case, namely, that we 
have to get the symbols right, and that the symbols should have something to do with 
distancing or withdrawal. So the state is implicated in certain sorts of wrongdoing by its 
citizens, or within its jurisdiction, to the extent that it needs to do something to dissociate 
itself from those actions; and it dissociates itself by withdrawing, partially or temporarily, 
the kind of special treatment that those in a political relationship can usually expect as 
members of that relationship. In other words, dissociation is brought about by the partial 
and temporary withdrawal of civil rights and status. Perhaps most obviously, this 
withdrawal would concern civil rights of freedom of movement and association, such that it 
becomes legitimate to impose certain things on the offender that could not normally be 
required of a citizen. The removal of voting rights could also be part of this package. 
(Alternatively, disenfranchisement could be a punishment meted out instead of loss of 
freedom for some offences: the argument is simply that disenfranchisement has some 
retributive value as a sentence.7) 
 
We can perhaps see how this proposal would escape at least some of the criticisms of the 
retributive justification of disenfranchisement that we considered earlier. To start with, I 
have at least gestured towards an account on which retribution is more than just the 
problematic notion of retaliation, and might start to look morally important, at least if we 
can make sense of the notion of dissociative actions. Secondly, the view presented here 
escapes the criticism that its notion of proportionality is so narrow that it can only be 
relevant to specifically political offences such as electoral fraud, or other politically 
motivated offences. On the view here, a specifically political response such as the removal 
of voting rights is appropriate, not because the crime itself is necessarily a political one but 
rather because the crime is a wrong that damages the political relationship (the 
relationship between citizens qua citizens, or the relationship between citizen and state) Ȃ 
in the sense that those involved in the political relationship with the offender cannot 
decently continue with the relationship as though nothing had happened. In other words, 
the sanction is a suspension of political status, not because the offence is a political one but 
rather because it is by virtue of their membership of the political relationship that the state ǯǡany rate the kind of interest which is such that it 
must dissociate itself from those actions when they are wrongful. Thirdly, although the 
                                                     
7
notion of proportionality is not as narrow as lex talionis, it does not make the 
corresponding error of becoming entirely indeterminate. The guiding thought is that there 
should be a suspension of civic status that is proportionate to the gravity of the offence. 
Although intuitions regarding cardinal proportionality are notoriously variable, that is not 
to say that there could not be an acceptable political mechanism for determining such 
proportionality. Of course, the argument here has simply been to show that 
disenfranchisement is the sort of thing that could be used for retributive purposes, and no 
argument has been advanced to show why it might be preferable to deploy 
disenfranchisement rather than imprisonment as a sentence, or vice versa, or to use both. 
Rather the implication of my argument is that we have to investigate the symbolism of the 
offence and the symbolism of the suggested sanction in order to judge the proportionality 
between them.   
 
One important thing to stress, however, is that this view liberates us from the idea that 
retributive punishment should be thought of in terms of imprisonment, or that it aims 
specifically at causing suffering. Retributive punishment, on this view, will involve 
something burdensome, something that involves the offender not receiving what would 
normally be his due, or not avoiding burdens that he would normally be entitled to avoid; 
but it does not aim at suffering as such, and it might seem unlikely that imprisonment is the 
only, or even a particularly good way of doing justice in these terms. As such, this view 
gives us the opportunity to think of a wider range of responses to wrongdoing that might 
count as fitting punishments. And as a result we can begin to see how disenfranchisement 
is the kind of thing that might at least resemble the kind of withdrawal necessary to 
dissociate from an offence. 
 
6. Temporary disenfranchisement for serious unmitigated offences? 
I now want to turn to the question of whether disenfranchisement as a punishment should 
be ruled out in advance on the grounds of a fundamental right to self-determination, as 
Cholbi has argued. The first thing to note about ǯ is that the right to self-
determination can be understood in two ways. First of all, it can be understood as a right to ǯǤǡ
right to be regarded as a free and equal citizen who is not to be arbitrarily dominated by 
others. Now if we interpret the right to self-determination as a right to exercise control 
then the right, if it exists, would seem to guarantee something like an absolute sphere of ǯǤǡ
such a right could be absolute and fundamental, since it is clearly permissible at least in 
some situations to invade negative liberty e.g. to prevent great harm to others (such as 
quarantining someone who has a serious communicable illness). It is more plausible to 
regard the fundamental right to self-determination ǯǯghts. The difference between these two 
interpretations ǯǯǯǡas long 
as those restrictions do not occur because of arbitrary preference, or arbitrary power, 
given to others. Thus a fundamental right to self-determination might be compatible with ǯǯin 
conditions Ȃ perhaps that they have been decided upon democratically, that they could be 
reasonably justified to you, that they are compatible with the public recognition of the 
equality of your interests with others, etc. The question, then, is whether the temporary 
removal ǯǤ  
 
This takes us back to the Albie Sachs objection. The Albie Sachs objection is that possession 
of voting rights is the basic status of citizenship, and that their removal is to treat someone 
as an outlaw, as unworthy to participate in democratic affairs. However, in response we 
might say that voting rights cannot be the only badge of citizenship. For there is a flip side 
to the right to make law, namely, accountability to law. When one is called to account one is 
treated as someone who should have seen the criminal law (or the values it expresses) as 
having compelling weight. One is called to give account to the law of which one is, as a 
democratic citizen, the joint author.8 Therefore, if the critic of disenfranchisement wants to 
explain what is wrong with that form of punishment, they will have to do more than to say 
that voting rights is essential to citizenship. Voting rights might temporarily be removed to 
express the seriousness of wrongdoing without citizenship being denied. 
 
Nevertheless, this does not by itself win the argument for the proponent of 
disenfranchisement. Any judgement about the proportionality of a punishment to a crime 
has to involve some view about serious the crimes are and how significant the deprivation 
is. And, if the view of sentencing theory that I have suggested here is plausible, one cannot ǯ
certain ways. For one thing, if we aim to be guided by the meaning of retribution as I have 
defended it here, we should take it as a principle that punishments should be constructive 
rather than merely privatory.9 The meaning of the punishment should affirm rather than 
denǯǡ
in some way working to restore the offender to the community. For instance, community 
service is a punishment by which the offender is given a useful, meaningful task the 
performance of which will result in his return to normal life. Its imposition can be seen as 
asking the offender to make up for what he did. Removal of voting rights, on the other 
hand, is purely negative, and is not geared towards the expectation of tǯ
resumption of an untroubled place in the community. Such a purely negative punishment, 
suspension of rights for its own sake, may be appropriate for some crimes, but only for 
particularly serious ones. For another thing, Sachs seems correct to say that voting rights 
are essential to citizenship; and although this may not explain why disenfranchisement 
could never be a suitable punishment, to remove voting rights even temporarily as 
punishment is to say that someone has done something that has placed their very 
citizenship in question to some degree. Many crimes, even serious ones, are committed by 
individuals who are not dead against the values underpinning the life of the polity. This fact 
should be recognised in the punishments offenders receive. Therefore suspension of such a 
fundamental aspect of citizenship should be reserved for those most serious crimes that 
                                                     
8 Of course, this rhetoric about being joint author of the law might give rise to scepticism, particularly in a 
society in which many may well feel that the only time in which they are properly treated as citizens is when 
they feel the force of the law. 
9 ǤǤǯǡǲǳǲǤǳ (Duff 2001: Ch. 5). 
ǯǤ
Because even in the commission of serious offences there are often factors that mitigate the 
malice shown in the action, disenfranchisement should be reserved for aggravated offences 
committed with special callousness or lack of concern. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper I have tried to find the strongest argument that might be given in favour of 
offender disenfranchisement. This strategy is important in part as a way of diagnosing the 
source of popular support for the voting ban. The strongest argument we have found sees 
disenfranchisement as deserved punishment. But even on this argument, the meaning of 
disenfranchisement as a punishment would have to be that the crime is something that has ǯǤh disenfranchisement is 
something that should be an option for certain crimes at sentencing, it should be reserved 
for serious crimes aggravated by particular callousness.  
 
Of course, one challenge for this position would be to explain how serious crimes need to 
be in order to require disenfranchisement. There is Ȃ surely Ȃ no magic point at which the 
seriousness of a crime becomes so great that it really merits disenfranchisement in a way 
that no crime of a slightly lesser seriousness does. Even if it is accepted that there is an 
element of arbitrariness and convention about drawing the precise boundary, there are 
two things worth saying: first, that the problem here does not seem any greater than it is 
with respect to other kinds of punishment (for instance, at what level of seriousness is it 
appropriate to introduce custodial sentences?); and secondly, the problem of the vagueness 
of boundaries should not deflect us from the recognition of an important scalar change in 
crime-seriousness that does need to be recognised by changes in punishments. 
 
Another serious challenge for the view I have put forward is the extent to which its 
plausibility rests on an idealisation of conditions of punishment and social conditions more 
generally (Lippke 2001). Say it were not the case that the vast majority of offenders are 
drawn from socio-economic groups that are already less well off, marginalised from 
political processes and disaffected in their attitudes to institutions of political and 
economic governance. Say it were not the case that the dominant modes of punishment had 
a tendency to further alienate offenders rather than providing them with a vehicle for 
moral responsiveness to the significance of their actions. Say it were not the case that drugs 
play a significant role in much criminal behaviour. In that case, it might be accepted, the 
arguments put forward here would have some bite. But in the world as it is, does the 
removal of the right to vote, specifically the symbolism of the temporary removal of a equal 
status that I have said is the key aspect to the punishment, likely to add insult to injury? I ǯǤ
taken into account is that, for all the problems inherent in punishment, there is also a kind 
of second class status attributed to a person when they are not held responsible for their 
actions as others are, and when they do not have to face up to the moral significance of 
what they have done. In which case there can be something unattractive in the idea of ǲǳ
own. On the other hand, though, it seems plausible that greater recognition should be given 
to the way in which challenging circumstances should affect the evaluation of the 
seriousness of the offence at sentencing. And in addition, it may be that, even if I have made 
a prima facie case for disenfranchisement, when we take the predictable consequences of 
such a policy into account it is not something that, all things considered, we ought to 
enforce. However, these are considerations to deal with in another paper.10   
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